Skip to main content

_

Notes from Underground

  And, indeed, I will ask on my own account here, an idle question: which is better—cheap happiness or exalted sufferings? Well, which is better?---Fyodor Dostoevsky ---Notes from Underground Fyodor Dostoevsky ---Notes from Underground Even now, so many years later, all this is somehow a very evil memory. I have many evil memories now, but ... hadn’t I better end my “Notes” here? I believe I made a mistake in beginning to write them, anyway I have felt ashamed all the time I’ve been writing this story; so it’s hardly literature so much as a corrective punishment.  Why, to tell long stories, showing how I have spoiled my life through morally rotting in my corner, through lack of fitting environment, through divorce from real life, and rankling spite in my underground world, would certainly not be interesting; a novel needs a hero, and all the traits for an anti-hero are expressly gathered together here, and what matters most, it all produces an unpleasant impression, for we are...

Hope

To be human is to be a miracle of evolution conscious of its own miraculousness — a consciousness beautiful and bittersweet, for we have paid for it with a parallel awareness not only of our fundamental improbability but of our staggering fragility, of how physiologically precarious our survival is and how psychologically vulnerable our sanity. To make that awareness bearable, we have evolved a singular faculty that might just be the crowning miracle of our consciousness: hope.-- Erich Fromm


The Sorrow and the Pity (1969)




What “The Sorrow and the Pity” does more brilliantly than anything else is to avoid abstractions and give its human portraits of people who tried to land on their feet during chaotic times.


In the late 1960s, director Marcel Ophüls was commissioned by French TV to shoot a documentary about the 1940-1944 Nazi occupation. He unearthed old sins, uncovered old witnesses and came back with a devastating 265-minute expose, a rap sheet as long as your arm and a film which exploded the myth of Vichy France as a hotbed of patriotic fervour. So troublesome were the picture's findings that it was not screened on French TV until 1981.
Weaving vibrant newsreel footage with contemporary interviews, The Sorrow and the Pity installs the town of Clermont-Ferrand as the microcosm for a cowed, craven country, presided over by the Blimpish Marshal Pétain and serenaded by the honeyed tones of Maurice Chevalier.
 Collaboration is the norm. A hairdresser shops her friend to the Gestapo, while a shopkeeper named Klein puts an ad in the local paper to assure customers he's not Jewish. France, it appears, was caught off guard and then sold down the river by its own middle-class. "The workers always showed more resistance," explains one old-timer. "But the bourgeoisie were scared."
In the film's second half, heroes belatedly emerge from the rubble. We are told of Gaspar, the bull-necked boss of the local Maquis, a mercurial Jewish politician who broke out of his prison cell and the faceless students from Clermont-Ferrand high school, who joined the Resistance and are no longer around to tell the tale. "Many of them have streets named after them," boasts their proud former teacher, who stood by and did nothing.



The occupation was such a complex matter, so much a matter of human nature, they seem to say. It is hard to explain to an outsider (and maybe even to oneself) exactly how a decision was reached, and why some Frenchmen collaborated with the Germans while others resisted and most simply tried to carry on business as usual.

Director Marcel Ophuls spent more than two years compiling the 50 hours of footage that was eventually edited into “The Sorrow and the Pity.” He spoke with the little people - some of them so anonymous they seem ashamed of their opinions, if indeed they have any - and with the larger figures such as Pierre Mendes-France, Georges Bidault, Anthony Eden and the German armaments czar Albert Speer.

The striking thing about all of these people is that, so far as I can remember, no one on either side brings up questions of morality in an attempt to explain his own actions. No one says that he acted as he did because he was right and the other side was wrong. This was certainly the basis for actions of many of the participants, but they seem reluctant to admit to such deep motivation.
The movie makes the point that France was the only nation that actually collaborated during the war and that de Gaulle’s “Free French” in London were in the embarrassing position of not being a government-in-exile, because France’s government remained in residence.

Those who “went along” did so, not because they were lacking in patriotism or moral backbone, but because it seemed the thing to do. Ophuls has pointed out in an interview that the establishment tends to remain the establishment, no matter what. To be in the resistance, he speculates, “you had to be a misfit, one who wouldn’t go along,” and this is a point the movie makes.

https://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/the-sorrow-and-the-pity-1972



le chagrin et la pitié #1


 THE SORROW AND THE PITY full >>>


THE SORROW AND THE PITY (1969) – REVIEW BY PAULINE KAEL >>>









France under the Vichy Regime

Collaboration, Resistance, and Daily Life (1940–1944)

Following the rapid defeat of the French army by Nazi Germany in June 1940, the French government signed an armistice. The Third Republic collapsed, giving way to the "French State" (L'État Français), led by World War I hero Marshal Philippe Pétain. Relocating to the spa town of Vichy in the unoccupied zone, this new regime replaced the national motto "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" with "Work, Family, Fatherland."






The Anatomy of the French State: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Vichy Regime (1940–1944)

The transition from the French Third Republic to the État Français, or the Vichy regime, represents one of the most complex and contentious periods in modern European history. Established in the wake of a catastrophic military defeat in June 1940, the regime was not merely a puppet administration but a sovereign, albeit constrained, government that sought to implement a radical reactionary agenda known as the Révolution Nationale. Led by Marshal Philippe Pétain and primarily orchestrated by Pierre Laval, the Vichy government navigated a treacherous path between state collaboration with Nazi Germany and an internal struggle for national purification. This report examines the ideological, economic, social, and judicial frameworks of the regime, tracing its origins in the 1940 collapse, its systemic participation in the Holocaust, its internal civil war against the Resistance, and its enduring legacy in the French national psyche.

The Cataclysm of June 1940 and the Armistice Framework

The collapse of the French military in May and June 1940 was a systemic failure that transcended the battlefield. The German Blitzkrieg overwhelmed a French army that was ideologically and strategically wedded to the defensive doctrines of the previous war. As German forces occupied Paris on June 14, 1940, the French government fled first to Tours and then to Bordeaux, where a fierce internal debate erupted regarding the nation's future. Prime Minister Paul Reynaud and advocates of continued resistance proposed moving the government to North Africa to continue the fight with the French Navy and colonial resources. Conversely, a faction led by Marshal Philippe Pétain and General Maxime Weygand argued that the government’s responsibility was to remain in France and share the misfortune of its people, a position that necessitated an immediate cessation of hostilities.

The resignation of Reynaud on June 16, 1940, cleared the way for Pétain to assume power as Prime Minister. Within days, he requested armistice terms from Germany, a move that was virtually inevitable once the psychological barrier of negotiation had been breached. The resulting Armistice of June 22, 1940, was a punitive document that divided France into a complex patchwork of administrative zones.

The Administrative Fragmentation of France

The armistice established a Line of Demarcation that effectively split metropolitan France into two primary regions. The northern and western portions, including the Atlantic coast and Paris, were placed under direct German military occupation, while the southern two-fifths remained "unoccupied" and under the jurisdiction of the new French government based in the spa town of Vichy.

Administrative ZoneControlling AuthorityStrategic Significance
Occupied Zone (North/West)German Military Command

Control of industrial heartland and Atlantic ports.

Free Zone (Zone Libre)Vichy Government

Rump state serving as the regime's administrative base until Nov 1942.

Annexed Zone (Alsace-Lorraine)Nazi Germany

De facto annexation into the Reich; excluded from French jurisdiction.

Italian Occupation ZoneFascist Italy

Small sector in the southeast; expanded to 11 departments in 1942.

Forbidden ZoneGerman Military

Coastal defense areas and northern border regions under strict security.

This division was reinforced by the German retention of approximately two million French prisoners of war (POWs), who were kept as bargaining chips to ensure the Vichy government’s compliance with German demands. The regime was nominally the de jure government of the entire country, but in practice, its authority in the Occupied Zone was limited to civil administration under German supervision.






The National Revolution: Ideology and Social Engineering

On July 10, 1940, the National Assembly, convened in the Vichy Opera House, voted 569 to 80 to grant full powers to Marshal Pétain to draft a new constitution. This act effectively ended the Third Republic and inaugurated the État Français. Pétain utilized these powers to launch the Révolution Nationale (National Revolution), a program aimed at purging France of the "decadence" of the interwar years and the liberal, secular values of the 1789 Revolution.

Reconfiguring the National Identity: Travail, Famille, Patrie

The regime replaced the republican motto "Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité" with "Travail, Famille, Patrie" (Work, Family, Fatherland), signaling a rejection of liberal individualism in favor of a hierarchical, organic vision of society.

  1. Travail (Work): The regime glorified manual labor and agriculture, viewing the peasantry as the "healthy" core of the nation. It sought a "third way" between capitalism and Marxism, implementing a Labour Charter in 1941 that abolished trade unions and the right to strike in favor of professional corporations.

  2. Famille (Family): The family was designated as the fundamental unit of the state. Natalist policies were introduced to reverse demographic decline, including subsidies for large families, the decoration of mothers, and the criminalization of abortion. The regime restricted divorce and encouraged women to remain in the home, viewing female labor as a threat to social stability.

  3. Patrie (Fatherland): Nationalism under Vichy was exclusionary and ethnocentric. It promoted a "true" French identity that was Catholic and rural, while stigmatizing "anti-France" elements—Jews, Freemasons, Communists, and foreigners—who were blamed for the 1940 defeat.

The National Revolution was underpinned by a massive cult of personality centered on Pétain, the "Savior of Verdun." His image was omnipresent on money, stamps, and public walls, and the song "Maréchal, nous voilà!" became an unofficial anthem. This cult was essential in securing early popular support, as a traumatized population looked to the aging Marshal as a grandfatherly figure who had sacrificed his person to save France from total ruin.

The Mechanics of State Collaboration

Collaboration with Nazi Germany was an official policy announced by Pétain following his meeting with Adolf Hitler at Montoire-sur-le-Loir in October 1940. This state collaboration was not merely a concession to force but a strategic choice intended to secure France a favorable position in Hitler's "New Order."

The Dual Leadership of Pétain and Laval

While Pétain served as the moral figurehead, the day-to-day administration and the heavy lifting of collaboration were often managed by Pierre Laval. Laval, a veteran politician of the Third Republic, was a pragmatic, often cynical negotiator who believed that France must actively assist Germany to avoid being dismantled. His rewards for this support included multiple stints as Prime Minister, though his zeal for collaboration often made Pétain wary. Pétain dismissed Laval in December 1940, only to be forced to reinstate him in April 1942 under German pressure.

Laval was instrumental in implementing policies that directly supported the German war effort, including the Relève—a program where French workers volunteered for labor in Germany in exchange for the release of POWs—and the subsequent Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO).

The Italian "Double Bind"

Between 1940 and 1943, Vichy was forced to deal with two Axis partners: Berlin and Rome. While the German armistice was the primary focus, the Italian armistice signed near Rome gave Mussolini a small occupation zone in the southeast. Rome pursued a policy of "prestige," seeking to annex large swaths of southeastern France and North Africa. Vichy initially sought rapprochement with Italy to counter German dominance, but as Italian demands grew more aggressive, the relationship devolved into reluctant compliance and opposition until Italy's surrender in September 1943.






Economic Exploitation and Financial Repression

The economic burden of the occupation was staggering, representing one of the largest resource transfers in history. Germany utilized the armistice terms to systematically siphon French wealth, which accounted for approximately 42% of all revenue extracted from occupied territories during the war.

The Magnitude of Occupation Costs

France was forced to pay 400 million francs per day (later reduced to 300 million and then increased to 500 million as the war turned against Germany) to cover the costs of the occupation. These payments were supplemented by an artificial exchange rate that overvalued the Reichsmark by 50%, making French goods extraordinarily cheap for the German military and private buyers.

Economic MetricMagnitude of Impact
Total Financial Transfers

479 billion 1938 francs (1940-1944).

Share of GDP

20% in 1940, rising to 55.5% in 1943.

Resource Extraction

80% of copper, 86% of nickel, 55% of aluminum.

Labor Draft Impact

600,000–650,000 workers sent to Germany; 3.08% welfare cost.

To finance these demands without triggering immediate hyperinflation, the Vichy government abandoned the free market and imposed strict financial repression. This involved forcing banks and savings institutions to shift their portfolios from commercial credit to government bonds, while the Banque de France kept interest rates artificially low. Despite these efforts, inflation reached 27%, and the real value of the franc plummeted, creating a legacy of debt and instability that would plague the Fourth Republic.

Complicity in the Holocaust: The State as Perpetrator

The Vichy regime's participation in the Holocaust was proactive and systemic. Unlike many other occupied nations, France enacted its own anti-Semitic legislation without direct German orders, reflecting a deep-seated domestic prejudice that viewed Jews as an "alien" element responsible for national decay.

The Statut des Juifs and Exclusionary Measures

The first Statut des Juifs (October 1940) defined Jews as a racial category and excluded them from the civil service, the military, teaching, and the media. A second statute in June 1941 expanded these bans to most liberal professions and initiated "Economic Aryanization," the confiscation and liquidation of Jewish property and businesses. The regime also created a Ministry for Jewish Affairs, led by the notorious anti-Semite Xavier Vallat and later Louis Darquier de Pellepoix.

The Mechanics of Deportation: The Vel d'Hiv Roundup

The collaboration between the French police and the German SS culminated in the mass arrests and deportations of 1942. During the Vent Printanier (Spring Wind) operation, the Vichy government agreed to provide quotas of Jews to the Nazis. The most infamous incident was the Vélodrome d'Hiver (Vel d'Hiv) roundup on July 16–17, 1942, where 13,152 Jews—including 4,115 children—were arrested by French police in Paris.

The regime’s autonomy in the "Free Zone" did not protect its Jewish population; rather, France was the only country in Europe where competent national authorities handed over Jews from unoccupied territory to the Nazis of their own accord. Crucially, Pierre Laval and other Vichy officials requested that children under 16 be included in the deportation convoys to "keep families together," effectively sending thousands of children to their deaths in Auschwitz. In total, approximately 75,000–77,000 Jews were deported from France; only 2,500 survived.

Daily Life: Shortage, Rationing, and Survival

For the general population, the Vichy years were defined by a "regime of penury." The systematic extraction of agricultural and industrial output by Germany led to severe shortages of food, coal, and clothing.

The Caloric Crisis

Rationing was introduced in September 1940, and the caloric value of French rations was among the lowest in Western Europe. While an adult male requires approximately 2,200 calories per day for basic health, official rations for adults (Category A) often provided as little as 1,080 to 1,300 calories. This energy shortfall resulted in malnutrition, a sharp rise in mortality, and stunted growth in children.

FoodstuffOfficial Ration (Adult per Unit/Time)
Bread

350 grams per day

Meat

300 grams per week

Cheese

50 grams per week

Sugar

500 grams per month

Pasta

250 grams per month

The scarcity led to a booming black market, which became an essential survival strategy for millions. This "parallel economy" involved everything from small-scale "grey market" bartering with rural relatives to large-scale criminal trafficking. The regime’s failure to manage the food supply—characterized by disorganized administration and counterproductive price controls—fueled popular resentment and undermined the initial trust in Pétain.







The Civil War: Resistance vs. Milice

As the occupation prolonged and the tide of the war shifted, France descended into an internal conflict that pitted the collaborationist state against a growing movement of resistance.

The Unification of the Resistance

The French Resistance (La Résistance) was initially a collection of scattered groups conducting guerrilla warfare, intelligence gathering, and sabotage. Following the German invasion of the USSR in 1941, the Communist Party brought significant organizational strength to the movement. In 1942, General Charles de Gaulle, operating from London, tasked Jean Moulin with unifying these diverse factions. This effort culminated in the founding of the National Council of the Resistance (CNR) in May 1943.

The Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO) in 1943 acted as a major catalyst for resistance. Thousands of young men fled the labor draft to join the Maquis, rural guerrilla bands that operated from the mountains and forests, turning the resistance into a mass movement.

The Milice: The Radical Face of Collaboration

In response to the "terrorist" threat, the Vichy regime created the Milice française in January 1943. Led by Joseph Darnand, the Milice was a fascist paramilitary force of 25,000–30,000 men. The Milice engaged in brutal counter-insurgency, including torture, summary executions, and the rounding up of Jews for deportation.

The conflict between the Maquis and the Milice was a true civil war. The Resistance targeted miliciens for assassination in public streets, while the Milice retaliated with massacres of civilians and the execution of political prisoners. The Milice’s brutality—often exceeding that of the Gestapo—made them the most hated symbol of the regime.

The Collapse and the Sigmaringen Exile

The Allied landings in Normandy (June 1944) and Provence (August 1944) precipitated the collapse of the Vichy administration. As Allied forces advanced, the Germans forcibly evacuated Pétain, Laval, and other senior officials to Sigmaringen, Germany. In this medieval castle, the "Sigmaringen Commission" operated as a pathetic puppet government-in-exile, continuing to issue decrees for a nation that had already liberated itself.

On August 9, 1944, the GPRF under de Gaulle issued an ordinance regarding the "re-establishment of republican legality," declaring that the Vichy regime was an illegal parenthesis and that the Republic had never ceased to exist.

Justice and the Purge (Épuration)

The liberation was followed by a wave of purges intended to punish traitors and "purify" the nation. This took two forms:

  1. Épuration Sauvage (Wild Purge): Extrajudicial executions and public humiliations (such as the shearing of women suspected of "horizontal collaboration") that occurred during the chaos of the liberation. Modern estimates suggest 10,000–15,000 such executions.

  2. Épuration Légale (Legal Purge): Formal judicial proceedings established by the GPRF to ensure a transition to civil order. Three major types of courts were created: the High Court of Justice, the Courts of Justice, and the Civic Chambers.

The Trials of Pétain and Laval

The High Court of Justice judged 108 high-ranking officials. Philippe Pétain’s trial began in July 1945. He refused to recognize the court's authority, maintaining that he was only answerable to the French people. He was sentenced to death for treason, but de Gaulle commuted the sentence to life imprisonment on the Île d'Yeu due to his age (89) and WWI record.

Pierre Laval’s trial in October 1945 was widely criticized as flawed and rushed. After a failed suicide attempt with cyanide, Laval was executed by firing squad at Fresnes prison on October 15, 1945.

Sentence TypeNumber of Convictions (Approx.)Note on Scope
Death Sentences6,763 (3,910 in absentia)

Only 791 executions were officially carried out.

National Degradation49,723

Loss of civil, political, and professional rights.

Forced Labor/Prison~15,000

Targeted at various levels of collaborationist activity.

The Vichy Syndrome and National Memory

The memory of the Vichy regime has undergone a series of traumatic shifts, a phenomenon termed the "Vichy Syndrome" by historian Henry Rousso. This syndrome describes the collective guilt, shame, and denial that has characterized French social and political life since 1944.

The Evolution of the Narrative

  1. The Gaullist Myth (1944–1970s): The portrayal of France as a nation of resistors, with Vichy dismissed as a handful of traitors. This myth facilitated national reconstruction but suppressed the memory of the Holocaust.

  2. The "Paxtonian" Revolution (1970s): The work of American historian Robert Paxton and the film The Sorrow and the Pity forced the French public to confront the reality of state-sponsored collaboration and domestic anti-Semitism.

  3. The Era of Repentance (1990s–Present): Trials of officials like Maurice Papon and the 1995 declaration by President Jacques Chirac finally acknowledged the state’s role in the Holocaust.

Chirac’s speech broke with the Gaullist tradition by recognizing that the "French State" was indeed France, and that its crimes were a national responsibility. Today, the memory of Vichy remains a "past that doesn't pass," continuing to influence debates on nationalism, secularism, and the legacy of the "dark years".

Conclusion: The Legacy of the French State

The Vichy regime was not a historical accident but the manifestation of a deep-seated reactionary current in French political life that seized the opportunity provided by military catastrophe. Under the guise of a National Revolution, the regime dismantled democratic institutions and engaged in systemic collaboration that made it a vital part of the German war machine. Its participation in the Holocaust, managed by its own bureaucracy and police, represents the absolute nadir of modern French history.

The struggle to confront this legacy has defined the moral and political trajectory of the Fourth and Fifth Republics. From the initial purges to the landmark trials of the 1990s and the official apologies of the 21st century, France has gradually moved from a position of "organized forgetting" toward a more nuanced and painful acknowledgment of its complicity. The "Vichy Syndrome" serves as a reminder of the fragility of democracy and the enduring power of historical trauma to shape the identity of a nation long after the events themselves have concluded. As the 80th anniversary commemorations in 2024 and 2025 demonstrate, the memory of those four years remains central to the French understanding of liberty, responsibility, and the true meaning of the Republic.

Popular Posts